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Decision support in patients with mild Alzheimer’s disease 
Introduction: Making advantageous decisions is a key competence of individuals 
of all ages. However, previous studies reported a reduction of this competence in 
patients with neurodegenerative diseases such as Alzheimer’s disease, which is 
explained by impairments of executive functions such as cognitive flexibility or 
working memory. While previous findings from healthy participants with 
reduced executive functions showed that support can improve decision making 
under risk, the study at hand aimed to investigate this effect in patients with mild 
Alzheimer’s disease (mAD).  
Method: A group of elderly individuals diagnosed with mAD (n = 14; mean 
MMSE = 24.14, SD = 3.18) and a control group of healthy age-matched controls 
(n = 14; mean MMSE = 29.29, SD = 1.98) performed a decision-making task 
(GDT) three times (t0, t1, t2) with intervals of five to nine days between each: The 
standard GDT plus other neurocognitive tasks (t0), the GDT with supportive 
information following each decision (t1), and again the GDT without decision 
support (t2).  
Results: At any time, mAD patients made more disadvantageous decisions than 
controls. However, the decision-making performance of mAD patients improved 
significantly with decision support. Interestingly, when the standard GDT was 
played again (t2), mAD patients’ performance remained similar to the 
performance in the GDT with decision support (t1). GDT performance correlated 
consistently with executive function measures in the control group, but only at t0 
in the mAD group. 
Conclusions: The findings indicate that supportive information about the 
riskiness of options can compensate for mAD-related deficits in decision making 
under risk. Thus, decision support can improve the quality of mAD patients’ 
decisions. Further, it may prevent mAD patients from making highly risky 
decisions in similar situations in the future. The persistence of decision support 
should be further investigated as it has relevant implications for every-day 
decisions that include risks. 
Keywords: decision making; Alzheimer’s disease; decision support; Game of 
Dice Task; executive functions   
Introduction 
Decision making determines people’s everyday lives from childhood through to old age. 
Even in old age, people are faced with choices that, in some cases, can have far-
reaching consequences. For example, decisions can concern medical treatment, 
contractual agreement, or wealth management. In older age, the risk of developing a 
neurodegenerative disease increases. However, people are still confronted with such 
complex decision situations. Neurodegenerative diseases, including Alzheimer’s disease 
(AD), were shown to have negative impact on decision making (for a review see 
Gleichgerrcht, Ibáñez, Roca, Torralva, & Manes, 2010). This is not only the case in 
decisions under ambiguity, which require learning from feedback, but also in decision 
situations that provide explicit information about possible outcomes, chances, and risks 
(Sinz, Zamarian, Benke, Wenning, & Delazer, 2008). These kinds of decisions, i.e. 
when a priori information about consequences and their probabilities is given, are 
referred to as decisions under objective risk conditions (for a recent review see 
Schiebener & Brand, 2015a). In decision making under objective risk, cognitive 
functions associated with reflective information processing, such as working memory, 
executive functions, and ratio processing, especially contribute to advantageous 
decision-making behaviour (Brand, Schiebener, Pertl, & Delazer, 2014; Pertl, Zamarian, 
& Delazer, 2017; Schiebener et al., 2014; Schiebener, Zamarian, Delazer, & Brand, 
2011). Executive functions comprise different skills that are relevant for cognitive 
control processes, such as retrieving and integrating information from memory, 
planning, behavioral inhibition and monitoring, evaluating and categorizing options, or 
forming and applying a decision-making strategy (Anderson & Tranel, 2002; 
Schiebener & Brand, 2015b). In AD, brain areas associated with executive functions 
and memory are affected from an early to mid-stage (Braak & Braak, 1991; P. T. 
Nelson et al., 2012). These impairments are assumed to be the main reason why patients 
with AD or other neurodegenerative diseases show deficits in decision-making tasks 
(Gleichgerrcht et al., 2010). Decision making, however, is not only determined by 
internal factors, such as cognitive abilities, but also by external and situational factors as 
suggested by theoretical models (e.g. Finucane & Lees, 2005; Schiebener & Brand, 
2015a). Some situational factors were found to help individuals with reduced executive 
functions to make more advantageous decisions in risky situations. For example, the 
decision situation itself can offer supportive information such as feedback, advice, or 
warning, which can improve decision making (Brand, Laier, Pawlikowski, & 
Markowitsch, 2009; Schiebener, Wegmann, Pawlikowski, & Brand, 2013; Yaniv, 
2004). The current study aims to investigate whether decision support can compensate 
for decision-making deficits in patients with mild Alzheimer’s disease (mAD) in a 
sustainable manner. 
Decision making under risk in neurocognitive diseases 
Patients suffering from neurodegenerative diseases such as AD show significant 
decision-making impairments in laboratory decision-making tasks (de Siqueira, 
Yokomizo, Jacob-Filho, Yassuda, & Aprahamian, 2017; Gleichgerrcht et al., 2010). 
Most of the studies summarized in a recent review by de Siqueira et al. (2017) 
investigated patients in early stages of probable mAD and mild cognitive impairment 
showing decision-making deficits in situations under both ambiguity and risk. The 
Game of Dice Task (GDT; Brand et al., 2005) is one of the most frequently used tasks 
to measure decision-making under (objective) risk conditions. In the GDT, a virtual die 
is thrown and participants are asked to bet on which number will be thrown next. 
Participants can bet either on a single number or on different combinations of multiple 
numbers (two, three, or four numbers) simultaneously. Betting on less numbers is 
associated with higher bet amounts, but also with a higher risk of losing. Accordingly, 
decisions for one number or a combination of two numbers are of high risk and 
objectively disadvantageous, i.e., the risk of losing is higher than the chance to win. 
Patients with frontotemporal dementia, dorsolateral prefrontal cortex damage (Bechara 
& Martin, 2004; Brand, Kalbe, et al., 2004), Korsakoff’s syndrome (Brand et al., 2005), 
Parkinson’s disease (Brand, Labudda, et al., 2004; Euteneuer et al., 2009), and mAD 
(Delazer, Sinz, Zamarian, & Benke, 2007) were shown to make significantly more of 
the highly risky decisions compared to healthy participants. Superior performance in the 
GDT is associated with high executive functions and other cognitive processes that are 
involved in the development and application of advantageous strategies (Brand et al., 
2014; Delazer et al., 2007; Schiebener & Brand, 2015b; Schiebener et al., 2014). 
Conversely, disadvantageous and highly risky choice behaviour may result from deficits 
in respective cognitive domains. The study by Delazer and colleagues (2007) supports 
this view. The analysis of response patterns in the GDT showed that mAD patients (in 
contrast to healthy controls) did not learn from feedback and did not adapt their strategy 
despite negative outcomes. The authors assume such disadvantageous decision-making 
behaviour to result from deficits in learning and executive functioning (Delazer et al., 
2007). AD initially affects medial temporal brain regions including the hippocampus, 
which is important for episodic memory and the construction of mental images (Bird & 
Burgess, 2008) and, at later stages, also frontal brain regions appear to be affected. 
These neurological changes lead AD patients to suffer from executive dysfunctions 
(Baudic et al., 2006; Binetti et al., 1996; Lafleche & Albert, 1995) and deficits in 
especially episodic memory (Bäckman, Small, & Fratiglioni, 2001; Bondi et al., 2008; 
Grady et al., 1988; Hodges & Patterson, 1995; R. G. Morris & Kopelman, 1986; Perry, 
Watson, & Hodges, 2000; Welsh, Butters, Hughes, Mohs, & Heyman, 1992), even in 
the early stages of the disease. Changes in executive functions and other cognitive skills 
such as cognitive flexibility, inhibition, and working memory appear to account not 
only for disease-related but also for general age-related reductions in the decision-
making performance under objective risk conditions (Brand & Schiebener, 2013; 
Liebherr, Schiebener, Averbeck, & Brand, 2017; Schiebener & Brand, 2017). 
Theoretical classification of decision support 
Theoretical models of decision making suggest internal as well as external factors to 
influence how decisions are made. The Person-Task-Fit Framework (Finucane & Lees, 
2005; Finucane, Mertz, Slovic, & Schmidt, 2005) defines that the individual decision-
making competence is influenced by characteristics of the person (internal) as well as 
by characteristics of the task and other situational factors (external). This differentiation 
between internal and external factors has also been applied to the process of decision 
making under objective risk conditions (Schiebener & Brand, 2015a). While internal 
factors comprise individual characteristics of the decision maker (e.g. age, impulsivity, 
or cognitive abilities), external factors include characteristics of the decision-making 
situation, e.g. additionally provided information and situational induced states, such as 
parallel cognitive load or stress. Executive functions and probability processing skills 
are internal factors, which are of particular importance for making superior decisions 
under objective risk (Brand et al., 2014; Schiebener et al., 2014). Executive functions 
(e.g. inhibition, set-shifting, cognitive flexibility) and working memory are assumed to 
be important for exercising cognitive control (including functions such as reflecting on 
options, feedback monitoring, planning, and strategy application) and for the evaluation 
of risks, which is why they are attributed to reflective information processing. Results of 
experimental studies indicate that executive functions are especially relevant in decision 
situations where no direct feedback about (long-term) consequences is available (Brand 
et al., 2009; Mueller, Schiebener, Stöckigt, & Brand, 2017), misleading biases are 
present (Schiebener, Wegmann, Pawlikowski, & Brand, 2012), or no support is offered 
(Schiebener et al., 2013). Accordingly, external influences of the decision situation, 
such as feedback or supportive information, can have positive effects on decision 
making under objective risk (see also Figner, Mackinlay, Wilkening, & Weber, 2009). 
Decision support was shown to be capable of improving the quality of decision 
outcomes and/or of reducing cognitive effort (Engelmann, Capra, Noussair, & Berns, 
2009; Todd & Benbasat, 1994). In an fMRI study, Engelmann et al. (2009) asked 
healthy participants to decide multiple times between a fixed amount (safe option) and a 
lottery (risky option). One group received decision support in terms of an expert’s 
advice on what option to accept and what option to reject. The advice was presented 
textually above the options. The behavioural results showed that decision making was 
significantly influenced by the advice. The brain imaging results showed that brain 
areas associated with calculation and evaluation processes (i.e. the intraparietal sulcus, 
anterior cingulate cortex, and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex) were less activated in 
participants who had received support compared to those who had not received support. 
Consistently, Schiebener and colleagues (2013) found that in decision making under 
objective risk, as measured by performance in the GDT, decision support in terms of 
explicit advice had a positive effect on the decision-making performance in healthy 
subjects. Especially individuals with below-average working memory and executive 
functions could profit from the explicit advice. In a pre-study, it was tested what kind of 
advice was most effective for supporting decision making in the GDT. The different 
types of support were: extended instructions, presentation of exact probabilities, 
presentation of the maximum gain/loss, additional test trials, and explicit advice on 
which options are advantageous. The explicit advice was shown to be most effective. 
The authors assumed that advice leads to a reduction of load on prefrontal cortex 
functions, which are involved in risky decision making (Schiebener et al., 2013). This is 
consistent with the findings by Engelmann et al. (2009), indicating that advice reduces 
the activation of brain regions associated with the evaluation of risk information, e.g. 
the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and the anterior cingulate cortex. A recent study by 
Burgio and colleagues (2018) provides evidence that training on executive functions 
and number processing can improve the decision-making performance under objective 
risk conditions in patients with mild cognitive impairments. The findings further 
support the view that deficits in executive functions in neurological patients with mild 
cognitive impairments are associated with more disadvantageous choice behavior, but 
that specific support addressing these deficits can help to improve decision making. 
Research hypotheses 
The current investigation is based on the study by Schiebener et al. (2013), which 
showed positive effects of decision support in the GDT for healthy individuals with 
comparatively reduced working memory and executive functions. Accordingly, we 
hypothesized that decision support can help mAD patients to make better (/less risky) 
decisions, as it may reduce the involvement of executive functions and thus compensate 
for respective disease-related cognitive impairments. Further, it can be assumed that 
decision support in terms of information about the riskiness of options provides factual 
knowledge that may be remembered when being confronted with similar decision 
situations again. Accordingly, we wanted to test the hypothesis that the positive effect 
of decision support may persist in similar decision-making situations in the future. 
Method 
Participants 
The current study investigated a total of 28 elderly participants, who were recruited and 
examined at the Alzheimer day center of the Vianorte-Laguna Foundation in Madrid 
(Spain). All participants performed the center’s standard diagnostic procedures. The 
mAD group consisted of 14 participants (4 females, 10 males) with probable mAD 
diagnosed by the local neurologist according to NINCDS-ADRDA criteria (McKhann 
et al., 1984). The mean age was M = 77.57 (SD = 5.96) years. The control group 
consisted of 14 elderly participants (mainly relatives and friends) not meeting the mAD 
criteria (8 females, 6 males), who were of matching age (M = 74.07, SD = 7.56), t(26) = 
-1.36, p = .185, and gender, χ²(1, N = 28) = 2.33, p = .127. The presence of significant 
vascular ischemic disorder was excluded according to Hachinski’s ischemia scale 
(Hachinski et al., 1975). All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal sight and 
sufficient hearing abilities. The years of school education (mAD: M = 10.14, SD = 6.24; 
control: M = 13.64, SD = 6.78) did not differ significantly between groups, t(26) = 1.42, 
p = .167. Participation was voluntary without payment. The study was approved by the 
ethics committee of the Hospital Clínico San Carlos in Madrid (Spain). All participants 
gave written informed consent before participation and were standardly debriefed 
afterwards. Participants agreed with the inclusion of material pertaining to themselves 
with the stored data being anonymized.  
Design and Instruments 
The current study followed a mixed design. Two groups of participants (between-
subjects factor), namely the mAD patients and the elderly controls, were tested at three 
different times (within-subjects factor) with intervals of five to nine days (due to 
practical reasons) between each (see Figure 1 for an illustration of the study design). In 
the first session (t0), all participants performed a decision-making task (the GDT) 
followed by different neuropsychological tasks assessing cognitive functions. In the 
second session (t1), five to nine days from t0, both groups performed the GDT again, but 
with decision support. Support was offered after each decision in terms of information 
about the riskiness of the respective choice, with the concurrent question whether the 
participants want to maintain or change their decision. In the third session (t2), five to 
nine days from t1, participants conducted the GDT again in the standard version without 
decision support.  
 
Figure 1. Illustration of the study design with three measurement sessions in each of which the 
Game of Dice Task was performed. 
 
The three different measurements were completely independent from each other, 
meaning that in each session the GDT started from the very beginning without the 
participants having been informed about their performance in previous sessions. Each of 
the participants was tested individually under similar controlled laboratory conditions. 
The instructions for each of the tests were given in a standardized manner. All tests 
were in the local language (Spanish).    
Game of Dice Task (GDT) - standard 
The GDT (Brand et al., 2005) measures decision making under objective risk 
conditions. The aim is to maximize a virtual capital of $1,000 by repeatedly betting on 
the results of a die roll. Figure 2 illustrates the GDT with its typical decision situation. 
Bets can be placed either on a single number (1 to 6) or on a combination of two (e.g. 
“3, 4”), three (e.g. “4, 5, 6”), or four numbers (e.g. “1, 2, 3, 4”). Different amounts of 
numbers are associated with different amounts of virtual money that can either be won 
or lost. The respective amount is added to the current capital in case the die shows one 
of the numbers that the bet was placed on, otherwise the amount is subtracted from the 
current capital. A bet on one single number results in a gain/loss of $1,000. 
Accordingly, due to a winning probability of 1/6 and a risk of losing of 5/6, betting on 
one single number is the riskiest option. Bets on two numbers result in a gain/loss of 
$500. They are also of high risk, because the chance to win is lower than the probability 
to lose (2/6 vs. 4/6). Bets on combinations of three or four numbers can result in a 
gain/loss of $200 or $100 respectively. Both options are of low risk, and thus termed 
advantageous, because of a winning probability equal or higher than 50%. The GDT 
consists of 18 rounds, in each of which a virtual die is thrown, while the betting 
conditions remain stable. After each decision, participants get explicit feedback about 
which number had been rolled as well as about the associated gain/loss and the 
respectively updated current capital. The overall number of advantageous over 
disadvantageous decisions (GDT net score) serves as the main performance measure. 
Furthermore, the choices for different combinations of numbers are stored in additional 
sum scores, with the number of choices for one single number (GDT one number) 
representing the frequency of decisions with the highest risk. In the current study, 
participants performed the standard GDT (as described above) in the sessions at t0 and 
t2. In the second session (t1), the participants performed a modified version of the GDT 
that provides decision support as described below. 
 
Figure 2. Illustration of a decision trial in the Game of Dice Task (Brand et al., 2005). 
Game of Dice Task (GDT) with decision support 
The GDT with decision support follows the same procedure as the standard GDT (see 
above), except that each decision is followed by a pop-up window that provides 
information about the riskiness of the just made decision. Concurrently, the participants 
have the possibility to adjust their decision. For example, when a participant chooses to 
bet on the combination “5, 6” (i.e., two numbers), the following information would 
occur: 
You just chose to bet on the following numbers:  5  6  
This decision involves a risk of losing money that is higher than the chance to win 
money. Do you want to stay with your decision or do you want to make a new 
decision? 
When a participant chooses to bet on a combination of three or four numbers, the 
supportive information is adjusted accordingly by stating that the decision offers an 
equal/ higher probability to win than to lose. The participant can then either “stay with 
the decision” or “make a new decision”. An exemplary trial of the GDT with decision 
support is illustrated in Figure 3. 
 
 
Figure 3. Example of the supportive information following a decision in the Game of 
Dice Task with decision support. 
 
As in the standard version, the GDT net score (i.e., the number of advantageous 
minus disadvantageous decisions) and the sum of choices for one number (i.e., the 
number of decisions for the riskiest options) are calculated as measures of the decision-
making performance. 
Neuropsychological assessment 
As screening instruments for cognitive impairments, we conducted the Spanish version 
of the Mini-Mental-State Examination (MMSE; Folstein, Folstein, & McHugh, 1975) 
by Blesa and colleagues (2001) as well as the Montreal Cognitive Assessment (MoCA; 
Nasreddine et al., 2005). In the MMSE, scores below 24 indicate (mild) cognitive 
deficits (Tombaugh & McIntyre, 1992). The MoCA comprises tests for different 
cognitive domains (attention and focus, executive functions, memory, language, 
visuoconstructive skills, conceptual thinking, calculation, and orientation) with scores 
below 17 indicating the presence of mAD symptoms (Freitas, Simões, Alves, & 
Santana, 2013). 
Executive functioning was measured using a computerized version of the 
Modified Card Sorting Test (MCST; H. E. Nelson, 1976), which has been used in the 
previous study by Schiebener et al. (2013). The MCST especially places demands on 
feedback processing, categorization, and set-shifting. In the MCST, a specific card 
should be sorted to one of four decks, each of which contain different kinds of symbols. 
Cards can be sorted after colour, shape, or quantity of the symbols. Once sorted 
correctly (indicated by a happy smiley face in the computer version), the next card must 
be sorted according to the same rule. The rule has to be followed until it is told that the 
sorting-rule has changed. The total number of errors (i.e. the sum of perseverative and 
non-perseverative errors) was calculated. Higher scores indicate weaker executive 
functions.  
Short-term and working memory were assessed using the Digit Span test 
(forward and backward) of Wechsler’s Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS; Wechsler, 
Coalson, & Raiford, 1997) with the “forward” subtest representing verbal attention span 
and the “backward” subtest representing verbal working memory. Furthermore, verbal 
fluency tests (regarding words starting with “M” and animals) were conducted (Benton, 
Hamsher, & Sivan, 1994; Spreen & Strauss, 1998). Thereby, the number of correctly 
mentioned words within a period of one minute was counted.  
The Stroop Color-Word Test (SCWT; Stroop, 1935) was administered for 
measuring inhibition of cognitive interference. The first two “congruent” trials of the 
SCWT require to (1) read colour-words and (2) name colours of coloured boxes. The 
third “incongruent” trial asks participants to name the colours of colour-words, which 
are inconsistent (e.g. the word “blue” is printed in green ink with “green” being the 
correct answer). Thus, in this third trial, participants are required to perform a less 
automated task (i.e. to name the colour) by inhibiting the interference caused by a more 
automated task (i.e., reading the word; Ivnik, Malec, Smith, Tangalos, & Petersen, 
1996; MacLeod & Dunbar, 1988). Correct reactions within a period of 45 seconds 
served as the performance measure in each of the three trials. 
Statistical analyses 
The statistical analyses were carried out with SPSS 24.0 (IBM SPSS Statistics, released 
2016). Parametric tests were applied despite the small sample size (see also Skovlund & 
Fenstad, 2001) with the GDT net score, which was normally distributed. A mixed 
ANOVA tested overall effects of group (between), time of measurement (within), and 
the interaction of both. In case sphericity was violated, dfs were adjusted by 
Greenhouse-Geisser correction. According to Cohen (1988), partial eta squared of η²p ≥ 
.01 indicates a small, η² p ≥ .06 indicates a medium, and η² p ≥ .14 indicates a large 
effect. Furthermore, separate analyses for the within and between factors were carried 
out in order to examine the effects of both group and decision support in more detail. 
Within-subjects effects were analysed by use of repeated measures ANOVAs carried 
out separately for each group (with GDT net score as dependent variable). T-tests for 
dependent samples were used for post-hoc pairwise comparisons. Friedman tests were 
calculated (with GDT one number as dependent variable) as the non-parametric 
equivalent of the repeated measures ANOVA. The between-subjects effect was further 
analysed with post-hoc pairwise comparisons between groups at the different time 
points of measurement using T-tests for independent samples (GDT net score) and 
Mann-Whitney-U-tests as the non-parametric equivalent (with GDT one number as 
dependent variable). Pearson product-moment correlations were calculated to test for 
bivariate correlations between the performance scores of the neuropsychological tests 
(MCST, Stroop test, verbal fluency task, Digit Span test) and the decision-making 
performance (GDT net score). Coefficients of d ≥ 0.2 and r ≥ .1 indicate small, d ≥ 0.5 
and r ≥ .3 indicate medium, and d ≥ 0.8 as well as r ≥ .5 indicate large effects (Cohen, 




The mAD group showed lower performance scores than the control group in all of the 
neuropsychological tasks (see Table 1). The difference in MCST performance was 
marginally significant, with mAD patients making a higher number of errors than the 
elderly controls. The mAD group showed mean MoCA and MMSE scores below the 
respective cut-offs indicating cognitive deficits. In contrast, the control group showed 




The GDT performance had been measured at three times: at t0 (standard GDT), t1 (GDT 
with decision support), and t2 (standard GDT) in both mAD patients and elderly 
controls. Figure 4 illustrates the mean GDT performance of the mAD group and the 
control group in each session (see Table 2 for the descriptive values). Multiple analyses 
were performed in order to investigate the effect of decision support on GDT 
performance (a) overall as well as (b) within each group and (c) between the two 
groups. 
Overall effect of decision support 
We analysed overall effects of performing the GDT with and without decision support 
on the decision-making performance (GDT netscore), taking into account both the 
within factor “time of measurement” (t0, t1, t2) and the between factor “group” (mAD 
and control). The results of the mixed ANOVA showed an overall effect of “time of 
measurement”, F(2, 52) = 4.99, p = .010, η²p = .161, as well as of “group”, F(1, 26) = 
7.05, p = .013, η²p = .213. These main effects indicate that, overall, the GDT net scores 
improved from t0 to t2 and that mAD patients, overall, showed lower net scores than 
controls. The interaction of the two factors had no significant effect, F(1, 26) = 0.44, p 
= .511, η²p = .017.  
Although the interaction between “time of measurement” and “group” was not 
significant, further analyses were performed in order to examine both effects in more 
detail, and to test the hypothesis whether decision support can help mAD patients to 
make more advantageous decisions under objective risk conditions. Therefore, we 
firstly analysed the effect of decision support (in terms of within-subjects differences in 
GDT performance between the three measurements) separately for mAD patients and 
elderly controls. Secondly, the between-group effect was analysed in more detail by 
comparing mAD patients with the elderly controls regarding their GDT performance in 
each session. 
Within-subjects comparisons per group 
Within-subjects differences regarding the GDT performance (GDT net score) in the 
different sessions (t0, t1, t2) were analysed separately for each group by the use of 
repeated measures ANOVAs and respective post-hoc pairwise comparisons. Figure 4 
illustrates the mean GDT performance scores at t0, t1, and t2 separately for mAD 
patients and controls. 
Within the mAD group, “time of measurement” had a significant overall effect, 
F(2, 26) = 3.96, p = .032, η²p = .234. Post-hoc pairwise comparisons with dependent t-
tests showed that mAD patients had a significantly higher GDT net score at t1 (with 
support) compared to t0 (without support), t(13) = -2.58, p = .023. The difference in 
mAD patients’ GDT performance between t1 and t2 was not significant, t(13) = 1.26, p = 
.229 (see Table 2 for the descriptive values). Because of the small sample size, we also 
concentrated on effect sizes for the interpretation of the results rather than on 
significance levels only (Aarts, van den Akker, & Winkens, 2014). Looking at the effect 
size coefficients, the effect of the performance difference within mAD patients between 
t0 (without support) and t1 (with support) was almost large, while the difference between 
t1 (with support) and t2 (without support) was rather small (see Figure 4 A for the 
respective values of d). 
Within the control group, “time of measurement” had no effect on GDT net 




Figure 4. Mean performance in the Game of Dice Task (GDT) at each of the three 
measurement sessions separated by group (control and mAD) and effect sizes of the 
session-wise comparisons within each group. Effect size coefficients, ds, corrected for 
dependence between means according to Morris and DeShon's (2002) equation 8. Error 
bars represent SEs. * p < .05.  
 
Additionally, we had a look at the number of decisions for the highest-risk option (GDT 
one number) as the dependent variable, because this score was often used in previous 
GDT studies with clinical samples. Since the variable “GDT one number” was not 
normally distributed, we performed equivalent non-parametric analyses. In the mAD 
group, on a descriptive level, the median number of highest-risk choices at baseline 
decreased after decision support and increased again in the third session (see Table 2 for 
the descriptive values). However, the results of the Friedman test showed no significant 
effect of the factor “time of measurement” within the mAD group, χ² = 2.15, p = .341. 
In the control group (see Table 2 for the descriptive values), the Friedman test also 
revealed no effect of “time of measurement”, χ² = 0.27, p = .875. 
Between-subjects comparisons per time of measurement 
In order to further investigate the overall effect of “group”, we compared the GDT 
performance between mAD patients and controls session-wise. The results showed that 
the mAD group had significantly lower GDT net scores compared to the control group 
at all times (see Table 2). 
According to the previous procedure, we additionally compared the number of 
high-risk decisions (GDT one number) using respective non-parametric tests. The 
results of the Mann-Whitney-U tests showed that, in each session, mAD patients made 




Cognitive correlates of GDT performance with and without support 
In order to test associations between cognitive functions measures (MCST, Stroop test, 
verbal fluency task, Digit Span test) and GDT performance (GDT net score) within 
mAD patients and elderly controls, Pearson correlations between the respective 
variables were calculated separately for both groups. The results showed that, in the 
mAD group as well as in the control group, the GDT net score at the baseline 
measurement (t0) was negatively correlated with MCST errors (see Table 3). This 
indicates positive associations between executive functions and GDT performance. For 
the mAD group, this correlation did not remain significant, neither at t1 (with decision 
support) nor at t2 (without decision support). Comparisons of the dependent correlation 
coefficients (within mAD patients) showed that the correlation between MCST and 
GDT performance at t0 differed significantly from that at t1, z = -1.86, p = .031 (one-
tailed). For the control group, in contrast, the correlation between MCST and GDT 
performance remained significant at t1 and t2 with decreasing but still large effect sizes 
(see Table 3). The other cognitive function measures (Stroop, verbal fluency, Digit 
Span) did not show consistent correlation patterns with the GDT net score in neither 
group. The only two exceptions were the correlation with Stroop performance 
(incongruent trial) in mAD patients at t1 and the correlation with Digit Span 




The current study investigated the effect of decision support in situations under 
objective risk conditions in mAD patients and healthy elderly controls. All participants 
were tested individually in three different measurement sessions (with breaks of five to 
nine days between each). In each of the sessions, the participants performed the GDT as 
a measure of decision making under risk: first, the standard GDT (t0), then the GDT 
with decision support (t1), and then again the standard GDT (t2). In each session, mAD 
patients made significantly more disadvantageous decisions compared to the elderly 
controls. However, mAD patients showed a significant performance increase from t0 to 
t1 indicating a positive effect of decision support. Within the control group, the GDT 
performance with and without decision support did not differ significantly. 
The results support the hypothesis that decision support can improve the 
decision-making performance in patients with mAD. This finding is of relevance as 
deciding among options with objective risks is important for everyday-decisions, but 
also for health-related situations such as choosing between medications with different 
risks of side effects or chances of recovery. The decision-making improvement in mAD 
patients was indicated by a lower number of very risky choices and a higher ratio of 
advantageous decisions in the GDT with decision support (t1) compared to the GDT 
without decision support (t0). Interestingly, when mAD patients then played the 
standard GDT without support again (t2), they performed comparably to the session 
with decision support (t1). At all times of measurement, mAD patients showed more 
disadvantageous decision-making behaviour compared to healthy controls. This is in 
accordance with previous studies on decision making under risk in AD and other 
neurodegenerative diseases (Delazer et al., 2007; Gleichgerrcht et al., 2010; Sinz et al., 
2008). Moreover, the control group performed equally well in all sessions. Accordingly, 
the effect of time of measurement was significant only for the mAD group. 
The findings indicate that decision support, in terms of explicit information 
about the riskiness of initially preferred options, can improve decision making under 
objective risk conditions in mAD patients. According to previous findings, mAD 
patients may have performed poor in the initial standard decision-making task (t0) 
because of deficits to adapt the decision-making behaviour to negative feedback from 
previous trials (see Delazer et al., 2007). When playing the task again but with decision 
support (t1), mAD patients on average made more advantageous than disadvantageous 
decisions and chose high-risk options significantly less frequently than before.  
The results extend the findings by Schiebener and colleagues (2013). They 
showed that decision support in terms of explicit information about the riskiness of 
options had a compensatory effect in healthy adults with reductions in executive 
functions, such as cognitive flexibility and working memory. The current study 
indicates that this kind of support can have positive effects on subjects that begin to 
suffer from AD, which is characterized by executive dysfunctions even in the early 
stages of the disease (Baudic et al., 2006; Bélanger, Belleville, & Gauthier, 2010; 
Lafleche & Albert, 1995). The lack of adapting behaviour according to the feedback 
from previous decisions may be a reason for mAD patients’ diminished decision-
making performance under objective risk (Delazer et al., 2007). This lack can be 
assumed to be due to impairments in cognitive flexibility, working memory, and 
episodic memory (e.g., Baudic et al., 2006). Confronting decision-makers with 
information about the riskiness of specific alternatives (as it has been done in the 
current study), may shift demands from episodic memory (involved in learning from 
experience) to semantic memory, which seems to be less affected by AD (e.g., Hodges, 
Salmon, & Butters, 1990). This is only one speculative explanation, however, it further 
fits to Bird and Burgess (2008), who state that semantic memory is not likely to 
dependent on the hippocampus – a region that is critically affected by mAD – as it does 
not necessarily require the construction of mental images. They assume that also 
complex long-term representations can be memorized without involving the 
hippocampus, as long as they are not associated with the construction of a mental 
picture of the environment. Accordingly, mAD patients might have been able to store 
the semantic association between options and respective risks, which was given 
explicitly by the supportive information. Further, they might have also been able to 
retrieve these semantic associations (rather than experiences) several days later. This 
may explain why mAD patients performed similarly in the second (t1) and third sessions 
(t2), although the latter was without decision support. Here (at t2), mAD patients might 
have recalled the information about the riskiness of certain options (given at t1) from 
semantic memory, which prevented them from choosing options where the risk of 
losing is much higher than the chance to win. Accordingly, the results of the current 
study let assume that decision support in terms of explicit information about the 
riskiness of options may have a longer-lasting positive effect for mAD patients in case 
they are confronted with similar decision situations in the future.  
However, we would like to note that this explanation is speculative and that, 
from the current study, no reasonable conclusions can be drawn on the reasons why 
mAD patients showed a trend towards an improvement of the decision-making 
performance after support, which further tended to remain stable over a certain period 
of time. It is also possible that the supportive information has led mAD patients to 
reason more about the decision situation and the riskiness of given options. For 
example, Pertl et al. (2017) showed that decision making was superior in individuals 
who reasoned about the given options before performing the decision task compared to 
those who did not. Also, the provided supportive information might have served as a 
kind of additional feedback, which can have positive effects on upcoming decisions 
(Brand, 2008; Lejarraga & Gonzalez, 2011; Mueller et al., 2017). We also acknowledge 
that practice effects in terms of a growing familiarity with the task and the presented 
options could be responsible for the persistence in mAD patients’ task performance. The 
possibility of practice effects being a confounding factor in repeated measures should 
also be considered in studies with patients suffering from mAD or other 
neurodegenerative diseases (Goldberg, Harvey, Wesnes, Snyder, & Schneider, 2015). 
In the control group, the decision-making performance did not significantly 
improve with decision support, which is in contrast to the results reported by Schiebener 
et al. (2013). However, it has to be mentioned that the current sample differed 
substantially from the sample in the before mentioned study, both in respect of size and 
mean age. The group of elderly controls, had already performed well at the first 
measurement and remained at a comparably high level at all measurements. That was to 
be expected as previous research indicates that decision making under risk is less 
affected by normal aging than decisions under ambiguity (Zamarian, Sinz, Bonatti, 
Gamboz, & Delazer, 2008). Elderly controls’ decision-making performance was 
consistently associated with executive functions, which is in accordance with studies on 
aging and decision making (for a review see Liebherr et al., 2017), whereby the mean 
decision-making performance was highest with decision support (t1). In contrast, mAD 
patients seemed to benefit more from decision support. Their decision-making 
performance, which was initially very poor, significantly increased with decision 
support.  
In the present study, the initial GDT performance (at t0) was strongly associated 
with cognitive flexibility and set-shifting abilities in both mAD patients and the elderly 
controls. Correlations of the decision-making performance with individual differences 
in other cognitive domains, such as verbal working memory or inhibition of cognitive 
interference occurred only occasionally. This adds to the inconsistent findings on 
associations between executive functions and decision making in mAD patients 
(Delazer et al., 2007; Sinz et al., 2008) and also in healthy participants (Brand et al., 
2014; Schiebener & Brand, 2015b; Schiebener et al., 2014). The current sample of 
mAD patients was too small to test for possible moderating effects of executive 
functions on the decision-making performance with and without feedback. Whether 
patients with less affected (compared to those with more affected) executive functioning 
would profit more or less from decision support should be subject to future 
investigations. A closer look at patients’ individual differences in specific executive 
functions may provide valuable insights into what kind of support is most effective for 
each individual.  
The current findings have practical implications for supporting patients in risky 
decision-making situations. According to the current results, providing explicit 
information about the riskiness of specific decision options may prevent mAD patients 
(and perhaps even patients with other neurological diseases) from making highly risky 
choices. Especially in the earlier stages of the disease, patients could be supported with 
easily understandable information, which may improve decision making especially in 
situations in their daily lives that involve choosing between options of different risks. 
For example, care staff and relatives could inform mAD patients more explicitly, in a 
clear and easily understandable manner, about the risks of specific actions, thus 
supporting decisions regarding, for example, healthy daily nutrition, correct use of 
medication, or even protection from fraudsters. The current study gives a first hint on 
that information about risky decision situations could be a way of compensating for 
cognitive impairments that are present in mAD. However, even if future studies will 
prove this kind of support to be effective, it will probably lose its usefulness as the 
disease progresses. It is possible that a combination of different supportive interventions 
is needed to improve decision making in AD patients. Recently, Burgio et al. (2018) 
showed that training patients with mild cognitive impairments in executive functions 
and numerical processing can help to compensate for deficits in decision making under 
objective risk. Future studies should investigate whether and which actions, such as 
cognitive training and explicit advice, are complementary, making it possible to prevent 
patients with cognitive impairments from making highly risky decisions. 
As a limitation, we cannot exclude practice effects due to task repetition in the 
current study design. Further, the variability in the time intervals between the 
measurements could have led to differential influences of learning and memory. 
However, it is unlikely that the decision-making improvement solely resulted from 
learning because of two reasons: On the one hand, a period of about one week was 
between each investigation, while mAD patients are assumed to be already impaired in 
integrating information from feedback occurring just a few seconds before the same 
decision situation appears again (Delazer et al., 2007). On the other hand, if learning 
effects had led to increased decision-making performance, one would have expected 
participants to perform best within the last investigation. However, performance 
measures for both groups tended to decrease rather than increase from t1 to t2. Future 
studies may compare the decision-making performance with and without decision 
support within two groups of mAD patients. Future studies should also ask the patients 
about their knowledge about the riskiness of the given options, both after having 
performed the task with and without decision support. Furthermore, research on positive 
effects of decision support could be extended to patients with other neurodegenerative 
diseases that include executive dysfunctions. 
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Figures 
Figure 5. Illustration of the study design with three measurement sessions in each of 
which the Game of Dice Task was performed. 
Figure 6. Illustration of a decision trial in the Game of Dice Task (Brand et al., 2005). 
Figure 7. Example of the supportive information following a decision in the Game of 
Dice Task with decision support. 
Figure 8. Mean performance in the Game of Dice Task (GDT) at each of the three 
measurement sessions separated by group (control and mAD) and effect sizes of the 
session-wise comparisons within each group. Effect size coefficients, ds, corrected for 
dependence between means according to Morris and DeShon's (2002) equation 8. Error 
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